FEBRUARY, 1788. THE NUMB. 3011.

PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1788.

MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

Summary of the Arguments in Convention, on the Debates reſpecting Biennial Elections. *(Continued from our laſt.)*

MONDAY, January 14.

GENERAL Brooks (of Medford) in reply to general Heath, ſaid, he recollected the paſſage of Monteſquieu; but he alſo recollected, that writer had ſpoken highly of the Britiſh government.---He then adverted to the objection to this ſection, of gen. Thompſon, and others, that biennial elections were a novelty, and ſaid we were not to conſider whether a meaſure was new, but whether it was proper. Gentlemen had ſaid, that it had been the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of this country to elect annually: But he aſked, have we not gone from a colonial to an independent ſituation? We were then provinces, we are now an independent empire; our meaſures, therefore, ſays he, muſt change with our ſituation. Under our old government the objects of legiſlation were few and divided; under our preſent they are many and muſt be united; and it appears neceſſary, that according to the magnitude and multiplicity of the buſineſs, the duration ſhould be extended; he did not, he ſaid, undertake to ſay how far. He then went into a view of the hiſtory of parliaments. The modern northern nations, he ſaid, had parliaments, but they were called by their kings----and the time, buſineſs, &c. of them depended wholly on their wills. We can, therefore, ſays he, eſtabliſh nothing from theſe; one general remark was, that in the reigns of weak princes, the power and importance of parliaments increaſed; in the reigns of ſtrong and arbitrary kings, they always declined: and, ſays he, they have been triennial, and they have been ſeptennial. The general combated the idea, that the liberties of the people depended on the duration of parliament, with much ability. Do we hear, aſked he, that the people of England are deprived of their liberties; or that they are not as free now as when they had ſhort parliaments? On the contrary, do not writers agree, that life, liberty and property, are no where better ſecured than in Great-Britain; and that this ſecurity ariſes from their parliaments being choſen for ſeven years. As ſuch is the ſituation of the people of England, and as no inſtance can be given wherein biennial elections have been deſtructive to the liberties of the people, he concluded by aſking, whether ſo much danger is to be apprehended from ſuch elections as gentlemen imagined?

General Thompſon. Sir, gentlemen have ſaid a great deal about the hiſtory of old times; I confeſs, I am not acquainted with ſuch hiſtory; but I am, ſir, acquainted with the hiſtory of my own country. I had the honor to be in the court laſt year, and am in it this year. I think, ſir, that had the laſt adminiſtration continued one year longer, our liberties would have been loſt, and the country involved in blood. Not ſo much, ſir, from their bad conduct, but from the ſuſpicions of the people of them. But, ſir, a change took place, from this change pardons have been granted to the people, and peace is reſtored. This, ſir, I ſay, is in favor of frequent elections.

[General T. was called to order, on the idea that he reflected on the laſt adminiſtration, a debate enſued, which ended on the Hon. Mr. White's ſaying, he wiſhed to put out every ſpark of the fire that appeared to be kindling; therefore moved to adjourn.]

AFTERNOON.

Dr. Jarvis opened the converſation of the afternoon by calling upon general Thompſon to proceed.

General Thompſon accordingly ſaid, that however juſt, however good, and however upright the adminiſtration may be, there was ſtill a great neceſſity for annual elections.

He thought a change of election was for the beſt, even if the adminiſtration pleaſed the people. Do the members of Congreſs, ſays he, diſpleaſe us, we call them home, and they obey; now, where is the difference of their having been elected for one or two years? It is ſaid that the members cannot learn ſufficiently in that time---Sir, I hope we ſhall never ſend men who are not learned. Let theſe members know their dependence upon the people, and I ſay, it will be a check on them, even if they were not good men; here the general broke out in the following pathetic apoſtrophe: "O! my country, never give up your annual elections, young men never give up your jewel!" He apologized for his zeal. He then drew a compariſon between the judges, &c. of this country before the revolution, who were dependent on Great-Britain for their ſalaries, and thoſe repreſentatives dependent on the continent---He concluded by hoping that theſe repreſentatives would be annually elected, and thereby feel a greater dependence on the people.

Mr. Gore.---It has been obſerved, that in conſidering this great and momentous queſtion, we ought to conſult the ſentiments of wiſe men, who have written on the ſubject of government, and to regulate our deciſion on this buſineſs. A paſſage is addreſſed from Monteſquieu, ſtating, that where the people delegate great power, it ought to be compenſated for by the ſhortneſs of the duration. Though perfectly agreeing with the author, I ſee not that it here applies to the ſubject under conſideration. This might be perfectly applicable to the ancient governments, where they had no idea of repreſentation, or different checks in the legiſlature or adminiſtration of government; but in the propoſed conſtitution, the powers of the whole government are limited to certain national objects, and are accurately defined, and the houſe of repreſentatives here is but one branch of the ſyſtem, and can do nothing of itſelf---Monteſquieu muſt have had in his mind the epiſtates of Athens, or the dictators of Rome, but certainly no ſuch obſervations can have weight in conſidering things ſo eſſentially different---But, Sir, gentlemen have ſaid, that annual elections were neceſſary to the preſervation of liberty, and that in proportion as a people lengthens the time which the repreſentative held his office, they loſt their liberties, and that all writers have agreed in this. I may be miſtaken, but I know no ſuch thing as a repreſentation of the people in any of the ancient republics, in England, from whence we received many of our ideas on this ſubject. King John covenanted with his people to ſummons certain claſſes of men to parliament; by the conſtitution of that country the king alone can convoke, and he alone, previous to the revolution, could diſſolve the parliaments to three years; but ſoon after, a parliament then ſitting, and near expiring, a rebellion broke out, and the Tories and Jacobites were gaining ſtrength, to ſupport the pretender's claim to the crown: ---had they diſſolved themſelves, and a new parliament been convoked, probably many of the very opponents to the government might have been elected. In that caſe they might have effected by law, what they, in vain, attempted by arms.

The parliament, therefore, extended their duration from triennial to ſeptennial---this was acquieſced in by the people, and the next parliament ſanctified the act----no evil, but great good, has been ſuppoſed to follow from their duration being thus extended---and if Monteſquieu, and Doctor Adams, think the Britiſh conſtitution ſo perfect, how much greater muſt be our ſecurity, when we reflect that our repreſentation is equal---that the powers of the government are ſo limited, and the checks ſo nicely appointed. If there be a repreſentation of the people in any other countries, and annual elections therein have been conſidered as the baſis of their freedom, I pray, gentlemen, to mention the inſtance---I confeſs I know none.---People adopt a poſition, which is certainly true, viz. that elections ought to be frequent---but then, as we have been in the cuſtom of chuſing our repreſentatives annually, we have determined annually to be frequent, and that biennially, or any longer term than annual, is not frequent: But if gentlemen will only conſider the objects over which this government is to have rule and authority---and the immenſe and wide extended tracts of country, over which the repreſentatives are to paſs, before they reach the ſeat of government, we ſhall be convinced that two years is a ſhort time for the repreſentatives to hold their office---but, Sir, we muſt conſider this ſubject with reſpect to the general ſtructure of the conſtitution. The ſenate repreſents the ſovereignty of the ſtates---the houſe of repreſentatives, the people of the United States---the former have a longer term in their office, it is then neceſſary that that body which repreſents the people ſhould have a permanence in their office, to reſiſt any operations of the ſenate, which might be injurious to the people, if they were annual.---I ſubmit it to the good ſenſe of this houſe, whether they would be able to preſerve that weight in the ſyſtem, which the conſtitution intended they ſhould have, and which is abſolutely neceſſary for the ſecurity of the rights of the people.

TUESDAY, January 15.

The honorable Mr. King obſerved, that the convention would do well to lay aſide the terms, annual and biennial, and conſider the ſubject as it could be ſupported by principles. Much had been ſaid of the inſtruction to be derived from hiſtory on this point---he preſumed to doubt whether this was the caſe. From the continent of Europe, he believed, we could receive no inſtruction: Their parliaments, after the overthrow of the Roman empire, were not conſtructed upon the principle of a repreſentation of the people. The conqueror of a given diſtrict of country was, by the feudel ſyſtem, the king or prince of the people within his conquered territories: When he wiſhed the advice of any perſon, he ſummoned, uſually, a number of his principal officers, or the barons of his kingdom, to give him their council; but the people, or, as they were degradingly called, the vaſſals, were never conſulted: This certainly cannot be conſidered as a repreſentation of the people. This mode of aſſembling a parliament probably obtained in the early ſtages of the Engliſh hiſtory; but thoſe who have wrote on this ſubject agree that their information is very imperfect relative to the origin of Engliſh parliaments; they are not certain who compoſed the parliaments, how long they held their office, or concerning what points they were conſulted. Nothing clear on this ſubject appears before the 12th century. Magna Charta is the foundation of the imperfect repreſentation of England: Improvements have ſince been made in favor of a more equal and certain repreſentation of the people; but it is ſtill extremely imperfect and inſecure. Perhaps the people of America are the firſt, who, by the ſocial compact, ever obtained a right to a full and fair repreſentation, in making the laws of their country.---If, then, hiſtory can afford little or no inſtruction on this ſubject, the convention muſt determine the queſtion on its own principles-----It ſeems proper that the repreſentative ſhould be in office time enough to acquire that information which is neceſſary to form a right judgment; but that the time ſhould not be ſo long as to remove from his mind the powerful check upon his conduct, that ariſes from the frequency of elections, whereby the people are enabled to remove an unfaithful repreſentative, or to continue a faithful one. If the queſtion is examined by this ſtandard, perhaps it will appear, that an election for two years is ſhort enough for a repreſentative in Congreſs. If one year is neceſſary for a repreſentative in the ſtate legiſlature, where the objects of his deliberations are local, and within his conſtant obſervation---two years do not appear too long where the objects of deliberation are not confined to one ſtate, but extended to thirteen ſtates---where the complicated intereſts of united America are mingled with thoſe of foreign nations, and where the great duties of national ſovereignty will require his conſtant attention. When the repreſentatives of the colony of Maſſachuſetts were firſt choſen, the country was not ſettled more than 15 or 20 miles from Boſton, they then held their offices for one year. The emigrants from Maſſachuſetts, who ſettled on Connecticut river, appointed the repreſentatives to meet in the general court of that colony, for only ſix months. Maſſachuſetts, although her ſettlements have extended over almoſt the whole territory, have continued to depute repreſentatives for only one year, and Connecticut for only ſix months. But as in each of theſe colonies, when under the Britiſh government, the duties of the repreſentatives were merely local, the great duties of ſovereignty being veſted in their king---ſo, ſince the revolution, their duties have continued local, many of the authorities of ſovereignty being veſted in Congreſs. It is now propoſed to increaſe the powers of Congreſs: This will increaſe the duties of the repreſentatives; and they muſt have a reaſonable time to obtain the information neceſſary to a right diſcharge of their office.---It has been ſaid, that our anceſtors never relinquiſhed the idea of annual elections. This is an error: In 1643 the colonies of Plymouth, Maſſachuſetts, Connecticut and Newhaven, united in a confederacy, which continued about 40 years: Each colony ſent two commiſſioners as their repreſentatives; and by articles they were to be annually elected. About the year 1650, the general court of Maſſachuſetts inſtructed their commiſſioners to propoſe that the elections, inſtead of being annual, ſhould be only once in three years. The alteration did not take place; but the anecdote proves, that our anceſtors have not had an uniform predilection for annual elections.---Mr. King concluded by obſerving, that on a candid examination of this queſtion, he preſumed the conſtitution would not be objected to on account of the biennial election of the houſe of repreſentatives.

Judge Dana. The intention of my riſing, ſir, is to acquieſce with the gentleman from Newbury-Port, in favor of the expediency of biennial elections of our fœderal repreſentatives. From my own experience, I think them preferable to annual elections. I have, ſir, ſeen gentlemen in Congreſs, and delegates from this ſtate too, ſitting in that honorable body without a voice--without power to open their mouths, or lift up their hands, when matters of the higheſt importance to their ſtate have been under conſideration. I have ſeen members in Congreſs, for the ſpace of three months, without power, ſir, waiting for evidence of their re-election. Annual elections, ſir, are not long enough, in ſo great a continent. They keep the members always travelling about; and I am of opinion, that elections for two years are in no way ſubverſive of the liberties of the people. I, ſir, am one of the people, thank God! and am happy in having an opportunity of expreſſing my perſonal ſatisfaction of ſuch elections. For theſe, and a variety of other reaſons, Mr. Dana ſuggeſted that he thought this ſtate ought to be the firſt to adopt this method of election.

The honorable Mr. White ſtill thought, that Congreſs might perpetuate themſelves, and ſo reign over us.

Honorable Mr. Gorham obſerved (in continuation of Mr. Dana's obſervation) that there was not now a Congreſs, although the time of their meeting had conſiderably elapſed. Rhode-Iſland, Connecticut, and ſeveral other ſtates, had not gone on; that there was now only five ſtates in Congreſs, when there ought to have been thirteen two months ago.

Mr. Carnes roſe to confirm it, and accordingly read part of a letter from the honorable Mr. Otis, the purport of which was, that there was much buſineſs to do, that only five ſtates were repreſented, and the probability of an Indian war, &c. evinced the great neceſſity of the eſtabliſhment of an efficient fœderal government, which will be the reſult of the adoption of the propoſed conſtitution.

Dr. Taylor roſe to anſwer two objections which had been made againſt annual elections; the diſtance of place was not ſo great but the delegates might reach Philadelphia in a fortnight; and as they were anſwerable to the people for their conduct, he thought it would prevent a vacancy; and concluded by ſaying, he did not conceive the arguments in favor of biennial elections well founded.

WEDNESDAY, January 16.

The 2d part of the 2d ſection of the firſt article, was read at the table----a deſultory converſation enſued on the mode of conducting the diſcuſſion; it was again agreed, that in the debate on any paragraph gentlemen might diſcuſs any other part they might ſuppoſe had relation to that under conſideration.

Mr. Pierce (from Patridgefield) after reading the 4th ſection, wiſhed to know the opinion of gentlemen on it, as Congreſs appeared thereby to have a power to regulate the time, place and manner of holding elections. In reſpect to the manner, ſaid Mr. P. ſuppoſe the legiſlature of this ſtate ſhould preſcribe, that the choice of the fœderal repreſentatives be as that of governor, a majority of all the votes in the ſtate being neceſſary to make it ſuch, and Congreſs ſhould deem it an improper manner, and ſhould order that it be as practiſed in ſeveral of the ſouthern ſtates, where the higheſt number of votes make a choice, have they not power by this ſection ſo to do? Again, as to the place, continues Mr. P. may not Congreſs direct that the election for Maſſachuſetts ſhall be held in Boſton? And if ſo, it is poſſible that previous to the election, a number of electors may meet, agree upon the eight delegates, and propoſe the ſame to a few towns in the vicinity, who, agreeing in ſentiment, may meet on the day of election, and carry their liſt by a major vote. He did not, he ſaid, ſay that this would be the caſe: but he wiſhed to know whether it was not a poſſible one. As the fœderal repreſentatives, who are to form the democratical part of the general government, are to be a check on the repreſentatives of the ſovereignty, the ſenate, he thought the utmoſt caution ought to bo uſed, to have their elections as free as poſſible. He obſerved, that as men have been ever fond of power, we muſt ſuppoſe they ever will continue ſo---and concluded by obſerving that our caution ought in the preſent caſe to be greater----as by the propoſed conſtitution no qualification of property was required in a repreſentative---and it might be in the power of ſome people thereby to chooſe a bankrupt for the repreſentative, in order to give ſuch repreſentative employment, or that he might make laws favorable to ſuch a deſcription of people.

General Porter (from Hadley) endeavoured to obviate the objections of Mr. Pierce, by ſhewing the almoſt impoſſibility of Congreſs making a law, whereby eight men could be elected as Mr. Pierce had ſuppoſed---and he thought it equally impoſſible for the people to chooſe a perſon to take care of their property, who had none himſelf.

Mr. Biſhop roſe and obſerved, that by the 4th ſection Congreſs would be enabled to controul the elections of repreſentatives: It has been ſaid, ſays he, that this power was given, in order that refractory ſtates may be made to do their duty: But, if ſo, ſir, why was it not ſo mentioned? If that was the intention, he aſked why the clauſe did not run thus. "The times, places and manner of holding elections for ſenators and repreſentatives, ſhall be preſcribed in each ſtate by the legiſlature thereof; but" if any ſtate ſhall refuſe or neglect ſo to do, "Congreſs may," &c. This, he ſaid, would admit of no prevarication. I am, ſaid Mr. B. for giving Congreſs as much power as poſſible.---It has been ſaid, Mr. Preſident, that the conduct of Rhode-Iſland, in recalling its delegates from Congreſs, has demonſtrated the neceſſity of ſuch a power being lodged in Congreſs. I have been informed, by people belonging to Rhode-Iſland, ſir, that that ſtate never has recalled its delegates from Congreſs---I do not believe it has---and I call on the gentleman who mentioned it to authenticate the fact.

The Hon. Mr. King roſe, and aſſured the convention that the ſtate of Rhode-Iſland did by a ſolemn reſolution ſome time ſince recall its delegates from Congreſs.

The Hon. Mr. Gorham confirmed what Mr. King had ſaid, and added, that during the ſeſſion of the fœderal convention, when ſeven ſtates only were repreſented in Congreſs, application was made by two companies for the purchaſe of lands, the ſale of which would have ſunk ſeven or eight millions of dollars of the continental debt, and that moſt preſſing letters were ſent to Rhode-Iſland to ſend on its delegates, but that ſtate refuſed---the conſequence was, the contract could not then be made.

Mr. Biſhop confeſſed himſelf convinced of the fact. He proceeded to obſerve, that if the ſtates ſhall refuſe to do their duty, then let the power be given to Congreſs to oblige them to do it.---But if they do their duty, Congreſs ought not to have a power to controul elections. In uncontrouled repreſentation, ſays Mr. B. lies the ſecurity of freedom:---And he thought by this clauſe, that that freedom was ſported with.---In fact, ſays he, the moment we give Congreſs this power, the liberties of the yeomanry of this country are at an end. But he truſted they would never give it---and he felt a conſolation in the reflection.

The Honorable Mr. Strong followed Mr. Biſhop-----and pointed out the neceſſity there is for the fourth ſection.-----The power, ſays he, to regulate the elections of our fœderal repreſentatives muſt be lodged ſomewhere-----I know of but two bodies wherein it can be lodged; the legiſlatures of the ſeveral ſtates; and the general Congreſs. If the legiſlative bodies

[*Turn to the fourth Page.*]

From the NEW-YORK PACKET.

The FŒDERALIST, No. XIV.

To the PEOPLE *of the State of* NEW-YORK.

WE have ſeen the neceſſity of the union as our bulwark againſt foreign danger, as the conſervator of peace among ourſelves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common intereſts, as the only ſubſtitute for thoſe military eſtabliſhments which have ſubverted the liberties of the old world; and as the proper antidote for the diſeaſes of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming ſymptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this branch of our enquiries, is to take notice of an objection, that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the union embraces. A few obſervations on this ſubject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adverſaries of the new conſtitution are availing themſelves of a prevailing prejudice, with regard to the practicable ſphere of republican adminiſtration, in order to ſupply, by imaginary difficulties, the want of thoſe ſolid objections, wich they endeavour in vain to find.

The error, which limits Republican Government to a narrow diſtrict, has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only, that it ſeems to owe its riſe and prevalence, chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy: And applying to the former reaſonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true diſtinction between theſe forms was alſo adverted to on a former occaſion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exerciſe the government in perſon; in a republic, they aſſemble and adminiſter it by their repreſentatives and agents. A democracy conſequently will be confined to a ſmall ſpot. A republic may be extended over a large region.

To this accidental ſource of the error may be added the artifice of ſome celebrated authors, whoſe writings have had a great ſhare in forming the modern ſtandard of political opinions. Being ſubjects either of an abſolute, or limited monarchy, they have endeavoured to heighten the advantages or palliate the evils of thoſe forms; by placing in compariſon with them, the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as ſpecimens of the latter, the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece, and modern Italy. Under the confuſion of names, it has been an eaſy taſk to transfer to a republic, obſervations applicable to a democracy only, and among others, the obſervation that it can never be eſtabliſhed but among a ſmall number of people, living within a ſmall compaſs of territory.

Such a falacy may have been the leſs perceived, as moſt of the governments of antiquity were of the democratic ſpecies; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principles of repreſentation, no example is ſeen of a government wholly popular, and founded at the ſame time wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of diſcovering this great mechanical power in government, by the ſimple agency of which, the will of the largeſt political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any object, which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of making the diſcovery, the baſis of unmixed and extenſive republics. It is only to be lamented, that any of her citizens ſhould wiſh to deprive her of the additional merit of diſplaying its full efficacy on the eſtabliſhment of the comprehenſive ſyſtem now under her conſideration.

As the natural limit of a democracy is that diſtance from the central point, which will juſt permit the moſt remote citizens to aſſemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join in thoſe functions; ſo the natural limit of a republic is that diſtance from the center, which will barely allow the repreſentatives of the people to meet as often as may be neceſſary for the adminiſtration of public affairs. Can it be ſaid, that the limits of the United States exceed this diſtance? It will not be ſaid by thoſe who recollect that the Atlantic coaſt is the longeſt ſide of the union; that during the term of thirteen years, the repreſentatives of the ſtates have been almoſt continually aſſembled; and that the members from the moſt diſtant ſtates are not chargeable with greater interminiſſions of attendance, than thoſe from the ſtates in the neighbourhood of Congreſs.

That we may form a juſter eſtimate with regard to this intereſting ſubject, let us reſort to the actual dimenſions of the union. The limits as fixed by the treaty of peace are, on the eaſt the Atlantic, on the ſouth the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the weſt the Miſſiſippi, and on the north an irregular line running in ſome inſtances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the forty-ſecond. The ſouthern ſhore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the diſtance between the thirty-one and forty-five degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and ſeventy-three common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to ſeven hundred ſixty-four miles and an half. Taking the mean for the diſtance, the amount will be eight hundred ſixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean diſtance from the Atlantic to the Miſſiſippi does not probably exceed ſeven hundred and fifty miles. On a compariſon of this extent, with that of ſeveral countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our ſyſtem commenſurate to it appears to be demonſtrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a Diet repreſenting the whole empire is continually aſſembled; or than Poland, before the late diſmemberment, where another national Diet was the depoſitory of the ſupreme power. Paſſing by France and Spain, we find that in Great-Britain, inferior as it may be in ſize, the repreſentatives of the northern extremity of the iſland have as far to travel to the national Council, as will be required of thoſe of the moſt remote parts of the union.

Favorable as this view of the ſubject may be, ſome obſervations remain, which will place it in a light ſtill more ſatisfactory.

In the firſt place it is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and adminiſtering laws. Its juriſdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the ſeparate proviſions of any. The ſubordinate governments, which can extend their care to all thoſe other objects, which can be ſeparately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it propoſed by the plan of the Convention to aboliſh the governments of the particular States, its adverſaries would have ſome ground for their objection, though it would not be difficult to ſhew, that if they were aboliſhed, the general government would be compelled by the principle of ſelf-preſervation to reinſtate them in their proper juriſdiction.

A ſecond obſervation to be made is, that the immediate objects of the Fœderal Conſtitution is to ſecure the union of the Thirteen Primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them ſuch other ſtates, as may ariſe in their own boſoms or in their neighbourhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be neceſſary for thoſe angles and fractions of our territory, which lie on our north weſtern frontier, muſt be left to thoſe whom further diſcoveries and experience will render more equal to the taſk.

Let it be remarked in the third place, that the intercourſe throughout the union will be daily facilitated by new improvements. Roads will every where be ſhortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travellers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eaſtern ſide will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the Thirteen States. The communication between the weſtern and Atlantic diſtricts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more eaſy by thoſe numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has interſected our country, and which art finds it ſo little difficult to connect and complete.

A fourth and ſtill more important conſideration is, that as almoſt every ſtate will on one ſide or other be a frontier, and will thus find, in regard to its ſafety, an inducement to make ſome ſacrifices for the ſake of the general protection; ſo the ſtates which lie at the greateſt diſtance from the heart of the union, and which of courſe may partake leaſt of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the ſame time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will conſequently ſtand, on particular occaſions, in greateſt need of its ſtrength and reſources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia or the ſtates forming our weſtern or north eaſtern borders to ſend their repreſentatives to the ſeat of government, but they would find it more ſo to ſtruggle alone againſt an invading enemy, or even to ſupport alone the whole expence of thoſe precautions, which may be dictated by the neighbourhood of continual danger. If they ſhould derive leſs benefit therefore from the union in ſome reſpects than the leſs diſtant ſtates, they will derive greater benefit from it in other reſpects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout.

I ſubmit to you, my fellow citizens, theſe conſiderations, in full confidence that the good ſenſe that has ſo often marked your deciſions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never ſuffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however faſhionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and perilous ſcene into which the advocates for diſunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by ſo many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the ſame family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happineſs; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, reſpectable and flouriſhing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulently tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildeſt projectors; that it raſhly attempts what it is impoſſible to accompliſh. No, my countrymen, ſhut your ears againſt this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts againſt the poiſon which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have ſhed in defence of thier ſacred rights, conſecrate their union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be ſhunned, believe me the moſt alarming of all novelties, the moſt wild of all projects, the moſt raſh of all attempts, is that of rending us in pieces, in order to preſerve our liberties and promote our happineſs. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely becauſe it may compriſe what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilſt they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not ſuffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for cuſtom or for names, to overrule the ſuggeſtions of their own good ſenſe, the knowledge of their own ſituation, and the leſſons of their own experience? To this manly ſpirit, poſterity will be indebted for the poſſeſſion, and the world for the example of the numerous innovations diſplayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happineſs. Had no important ſtep been taken by the leaders of the revolution for which a precedent could not be diſcovered, no government eſtabliſhed of which an exact model did not preſent itſelf, the people of the United States might, at this moment, have been numbered among the melancholy victims of miſguided councils, muſt at beſt have been labouring under the weight of ſome of thoſe forms which have cruſhed the liberties of the reſt of mankind. Happily for America, happily we truſt for the whole human race, they purſued a new and more noble courſe. They accompliſhed a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human ſociety: They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the deſign of a great confederacy, which it is incumbent on their ſucceſſors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewneſs of them. If they erred moſt in the ſtructure of the union, this was the work moſt difficult to be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your Convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.

PUBLIUS.

NUMBER II.

To the PEOPLE of the UNITED STATES.

Friends and Countrymen,

MEN of cautious and moderate tempers may perhaps be unfavorably diſpoſed towards a writer, who introduces into the diſcuſſions of the propoſed conſtitution the affairs of his own ſtate; but when they remember, that it is in order to explain *the ſprings of action* and general ſentiments on government of its opponents in that place, and when they obſerve his papers are unſullied by any indecency, and that they are free, *at leaſt, from the virulence* of party, they may deem them worthy of a peruſal.

In my laſt number I promiſed to lay before you ſome parts of the conſtitution of Pennſylvania, which the oppoſition declare they approve and admire, in order that you might be enabled to judge for yourſelves, how far you are likely to concur with them in any plan of fœderal government.

The judicial power has been juſtly conſidered as the bulwark of our republics. Its perfect independency is deemed one of the maſt valuable modern improvements in the ſcience of Government. The ſtate of Rhode-Iſland has been arreſted *in the career of ruin* by a pure and firm judiciary. Feeling, as I am ſure you do, the force and truth of theſe facts, it remains only for me to inform you, that the judges of the ſupreme court of judicature, by the conſtitution of this commonwealth, can be commiſſioned "*for ſeven years only*," and that "they are *removable at any time for miſbehaviour by the General Aſſembly*."

Beſides this court, which the frame of government terms ſupreme, there is eſtabliſhed by law, under the powers of the conſtitution, "An high court of errors and appeals," of which the four *temporary and removable judges* of the other court form a part, and there are three others ſpecially commiſſioned *for ſeven years alſo*, and removable for miſbehaviour at any time *by the Aſſembly*. The Preſident of the Supreme Executive Council is at the head of this court, though in the Executive Board over which he preſides he may have been the mover of the appeal depending. To theſe is added the judge of admiralty, who is alſo appointed for ſeven years only. Such are our two ſupreme courts of judicature in this ſtate.

The ſupreme executive authority, conſtituted as we ſhall preſently deſcribe, hear and determine all impeachments: Thus are *the executive power and the higheſt criminal judiciary* in the ſtate placed in the ſame hands.

The juſtices of the peace, who are to adjuſt thoſe infinite little diſputes and breaches of order that ariſe from the paſſions of the people, are choſen, not by the executive power, nor during good behaviour, but by the freeholders of the ſeveral wards and townſhips in the ſtate, for ſeven years, and ſubject to removal by the Aſſembly. In Pennſylvania, from the practice of creating ground-rents, this claſs of judges, ſo important to the order and happineſs of ſociety, may be almoſt conſidered as holding their appointments by popular election. That I may not ſubject my meaning to miſconception or perverſion, I ſubmit to the judgment of the candid, whether it would not be better for the Supreme Executive Council, whom the people elect, to appoint the juſtices of the peace.

No man, ſays our bill of rights, who acknowledges the being of a God, ſhall be deprived of his civil rights as a citizen on account of his religious ſentiments; yet, if the people of a county were unanimouſly to chooſe a wiſe, virtuous, and legally qualified citizen to repreſent them in the legiſlature, the conſtitution excludes him from his ſeat, and reſtrains him from the performance of his public duty, unleſs he takes a religious teſt.

"All free governments, ſays our conſtitution, are neceſſarily founded on the authority of the people only;"---"and ſuch *original principles* ſhould be eſtabliſhed, as will beſt promote *the general* happineſs of the people of this ſtate." Yet our Supreme Executive Power is by this very conſtitution created by the votes of 24000 electors out of 69000! This requires fuller explanation. The frame of government entitles every *county* to ſend a member to the Supreme Executive Council, which at this time conſiſts of nineteen members, there being ſo many counties in the ſtate. By the laſt returns, taken I think in 1785, ten of theſe counties, having 24000 electors, ſend ten members of council, *a majority of the whole*; the remaining nine counties ſending each a ſingle member only, are a minority of council, though they have 45000 electors, and ten times the taxable property. Does this conſtitution then adhere, my countrymen, to thoſe *original principles* that will beſt promote *the general* happineſs of the people of this ſtate? or does it violate *the juſtice* due to *each* citizen, and the eſſential principle of *equality* in a republic? Unjuſt as this muſt appear to you, my fellow citizens of the union, there is yet *a greater deviation from the principles of liberty* exiſting in our frame of government. Being a novel arrangement, ſome pains will be neceſſary to explain it. The conſtitution of the ſtate is of courſe our ſupreme law, but as it is liable, like other things, to errors and defects, it is provided that alterations may be made in it. The mode of doing it deviates further from liberty, and approaches nearer to tyranny, perhaps than any other regulation we know of in a government pretending to freedom. At the end of every ſeven years, a body, termed "*the Council of Cenſors*," is elected, to conſider the conduct of our various officers, *and the conſtitution itſelf*. Two thirds of this body muſt pronounce any error or defect to exiſt in the conſtitution, before a convention can be called to amend it. Two Cenſors are choſen by *each county*, without the leaſt regard to *the number of electors*, or any other conſideration, but the diviſion into counties. There are in the ſtate nineteen counties, and the Cenſors from *ſeven* of the number, having by actual return no more than 13000 taxable inhabitants, can prevent any alteration in the conſtitution; *nay, can deprive the people of even the opportunity of conſidering it in convention*, though the Cenſors choſen by all the other taxable inhabitants of the ſtate, being by the ſame returns *fifty-ſix thouſand*, ſhould *unanimouſly* deſire it. Thus it appears, in contempt of *the ſacred principle of equality*, the eſſence, the baſis of a free government, *leſs than one fifth* of the people of Pennſylvania can at all times preſcribe that ſupreme law of the land, the conſtitution of the Commonwealth. To term our government *a republic* is a political ſoleciſm. To perſiſt in the preſervation of this part of it, muſt ſubject its ſupporters to the unanſwerable charge of exerciſing *a tyrannical oligarchy*. But I refrain from further obſervation. 'Tis my part only to ſtate the facts, and leave all judgment on them to you, who are heated by no perſonal feelings, who are warped by no deſires or expectations of the honors, powers or emoluments of the ſtate.

The legiſlative powers of Pennſylvania are veſted by the frame of government in *a ſingle Houſe of Repreſentatives*. The Hon. George Maſon, Eſquire, of Virginia, affirmed in the late Federal Convention, that the people of the United States were attached to *the diviſion* of the legiſlative power, and I believe he affirmed it ſincerely and truly, for I am ſatisfied there is a majority in favour of *two houſes*, even in Pennſylvania. We know that eleven ſtates have actually made the diviſion in their reſpective conſtitutions, and that there never has been a complaint againſt it, or an attempt to effect a change, *except by the deluded followers of Daniel Shays*. We know, too, that the conſtitutions of all thoſe ſtates to which the diſſentient members of the fœderal convention belong, have divided the powers of legiſlation into two or more branches. Governor Randolph, of Virginia, in his obſervations on the fœderal government, bears his teſtimony againſt the inveſtment of the legiſlative power in a ſingle houſe. I did not intend to enter into the merits of our ſtate conſtitution, but ſimply and clearly to delineate its principal features, reſting, as I now do, upon your judgment, the probability of your concuring in any plan of fœderal government with thoſe who decidedly *approve its principles, and admire its operations*. Suffer me again to obſerve, that, whatever may be the feelings of my boſom, I mean neither to offend nor cenſure the oppoſition in Pennſylvania, but wiſh only to enable you more eaſily to determine for yourſelves, whether another General Convention, or any thing leſs than a total alteration of your moſt eſtabliſhed opinions on government, could unite you in ſentiment with them.

Apologizing for this preparatory explanation of the domeſtic politics of Pennſylvania, and ſubmitting its uſefulneſs to your judgment, I ſhall proceed to examine ſuch parts of the addreſs of the minority of our Convention, as have either been hitherto unnoticed, or on which further obſervation may appear neceſſary.

They commence with a formal declaration, that "it was not until *after the termination* of the late glorious conteſt, which made the people of the united ſtates an independent nation, that *any defect* was diſcovered in the preſent confederation." I refer you, my countrymen, to your own recollection, for *the extreme error* of this aſſertion. The lamentable deficiency of the fœderal treaſury, and the conſequent deſertion and revolt of the army, are univerſally known. Governor Randolph, of Virginia, on whoſe diſſent, before his letter appeared, theſe gentlemen placed ſo much dependence, tells you, "that *ſevere experience* under the preſſure of WAR" is one of ſeveral circumſtances, "which have condemned the hope of grandeur and of *ſafety* under the auſpices of the confederation." In the exigencies of *the war*, he continues, "the hiſtory of its effects is ſhort;" but, *however ſhort, this period* is diſtinguiſhed by melancholy teſtimonials of its *inability* to maintain in harmony the ſocial intercourſe of the ſtates, to defend Congreſs againſt encroachments on their rights, and to obtain by requiſitions ſupplies to the fœderal treaſury, or recruits to the fœderal armies.

The various duties neceſſarily required of the late *beloved* and illuſtrious commander in chief, placed him in a ſituation to form the beſt obſervations on the defects of the confederation. He tells us, in his circular letter of 1783, that the war could have been happily terminated at an earlier day, if the reſources of the continent could have been properly called forth; that the diſtreſſes and diſappointments which often occurred, have, in too many inſtances, reſulted more from *a want of energy in the continental government*, than from a deficiency of means in the particular ſtates; that there was a *want of authority in the ſupreme power* of the union, and that *the defects of the fœderal government* were, at the termination of the war, "*notorious facts*." The error of the aſſertion in the addreſs is ſo fully contradicted by the knowledge of every man, that I really ſhould have omitted to notice it, were it not to ſhew how cautiouſly you ſhould receive *other aſſertions*, which are made in the courſe of that paper, and of which you do not poſſeſs the equal means of refutation. Whether you conſider this deviation from fact as proceding from *inattention* or from *want of information*, it muſt create *a reaſonable diſtruſt* of other matters, which they aſſert to be true. I acquit them, as a body, of an intention to deceive in this particular.

When we conſider the late period, March 1781, at which the preſent confederation was compleated, and that it could not inſtantly take effect, we cannot omit to notice their next aſſertion, that it carried us ſucceſsfully through the war. The Britiſh arms had been baniſhed from Maſſachuſetts and Pennſylvania, and once from South-Carolina; Dunmore had been expelled from Virgi-

nia; the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga, the alliance with France and Holland, and the war of Britain with Spain, had all taken place; the armed neutrality, that curb of the Britiſh navy, had been formed before the articles of confederation were acceded to by the ſtate of Maryland. Effects then are aſcribed by the addreſſers to *a weak and inefficient fœderal conſtitution*, which were owing to *the proweſs* of America, *the blunders* of her enemies, the numbers and *exertions* of her allies, and THE BLESSING OF HEAVEN UPON HER ARMS.

The minority of the convention aſſert in their addreſs, that the legiſlatures of twelve ſtates complied with the recommendation of Congreſs for calling a Convention ſo haſtily, as not to conſult their conſtituents. The report of the Convention, which met at Annapolis in September 1785, on which the motion of Virginia and the recommendation of Congreſs were founded, was made in September, during the ſeſſion of the Aſſembly of Pennſylvania, and was publiſhed throughout the Union before the end of October of that year. The citizens of the United States and all their repreſentatives had ample time to conſult and determine on a meaſure, of which the addreſſers ſay the neceſſity was admitted by all. Pennſylvania was among the firſt to appoint, and ſhe did it by an act of her new legiſlature in the month of December following; and it is worthy of remark, that a number of the principal members of this minority concurred in the meaſure.

The doors of the Fœderal Convention, ſay they, were kept ſhut. When you conſider the Convention in its true light, as *a mere Council of Adviſement*, without power to legiſlate, fitting to deviſe a plan for the better formation of the fœderal and ſtate governments, and for the people themſelves, and that they unanimouſly determined the plan ought to be openly publiſhed for the conſideration of all, you will not deem the ſhutting of the doors an improper meaſure. It is the uniform rule of every body of the nature of a council, in the freeſt governments. Would it have been proper for the enemies of America to hear every weakneſs of our country feelingly lamented by a WASHINGTON, or blazoned by a Luther Martin. You are are told by the Minority, that *a reſolution* was propoſed to the Aſſembly of Pennſylvania for calling a convention to be elected *in ten days*. This they ſay "*a minority oppoſed, but finding it could not be prevented, that they abſented themſelves from the houſe.*" This ſtatement is really not true; for there was not one reſolution only, but a ſet of five, propoſed, which, by agreement, were to be taken up diſtinctly. The two firſt reſolutions, including generally the call of a convention, and fixing the places, manner and officers to conduct the election, were debated and duly carried by 43 againſt 19. The Houſe poſtponed the conſideration of the 3d, 4th and 5th reſolutions till the afternoon, by regularly adjourning. In the afternoon, when the 3d reſolution (which did not name *a time only ten days diſtant for all the ſtate*, but eleven days for a part of the ſtate, and twenty-four days for the remainder) I ſay in the afternoon, when the 3d reſolution would have become, for the firſt time, the ſubject of debate, the minority of 19 ſeceded. It appears therefore they have ſtated the time untruly, and that, though they ſay the *minority offered every argument in their power* to oppoſe reſolutions fixing the election of the convention at ten days diſtance, they never ſpoke on the ſubject of the time, nor even attended the debate when they knew it would come on, but declined to execute their public duty, not chuſing to acquieſce in the conſtitutional authority of the majority.

They give you to underſtand, that the queſtion for calling a Convention was *depending* at the time of their ſeceſſion, and that it was after the members were carried to the Houſe, that the reſolution for the call was compleated. This was not the caſe; for the journals of the Houſe will prove that the reſolution for calling a Convention was duly carried in the preſence of the whole legiſlature, ſix abſentees excepted, the diviſion being 43 to 19 in the morning of the 28th September. The minority firſt abſented themſelves (after regular adjournment to that hour) at four o'clock in the afternoon of the ſame day.

Without treſpaſſing longer on your time, I ſhall cloſe this paper, and with it the examination of the introduction to the addreſs, truſting that you are now better able to judge of the value of the political principles of the addreſſers, and of the temper and views with which they have written.

A PENNSYLVANIAN.

AUGUSTA, January 5.

We have the pleaſure to announce to the public, that on Wedneſday laſt the Convention of this State unanimouſly ratified the Fœderal Conſtitution in the words following, viz.

STATE OF GEORGIA.
IN CONVENTION.
WEDNESDAY, *January* 2, 1788.

WE, the Delegates of the people of the State of Georgia, in Convention met, having taking into our ſerious conſideration the Fœderal Conſtitution, agreed upon and propoſed by the Deputies of the United States in General Convention, held in the city of Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-ſeven, have aſſented to, ratified and adopted, and by theſe preſents do, in virtue of the powers and authority to us given by the people of the ſaid State for that purpoſe, for and in behalf of ourſelves and conſtituents, fully and entirely aſſent to, ratify and adopt the ſaid Conſtitution, which is hereunto annexed under the great ſeal of the ſaid State.

DONE in Convention, at Auguſta, in the ſaid State, on the ſecond day of January, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-eight, and of the independence of the United States the twelfth.

BOSTON *February* 4.

A Copy of AMENDMENTS ſubmitted to the Convention by His Excellency the Governor, who, on Wedneſday laſt, after a long and painful indiſpoſition, took the Chair, as Preſident of that honorable Body, now ſitting in this town, and on Thurſday forenoon publicly communicated his intention of making a propoſition in the afternoon on the important ſubject before them. The houſe was uncommonly crouded in conſequence, and the moſt profound ſilence was obſerved, while His Excellency was delivering his ſhort and elegant ſpeech to introduce this important matter. The feeble health of His Excellency, the ardent expectation of perſons of every deſcription, and the uncertainty prevailing as to the nature of the propoſition to be made, conſpired to render the ſcene as intereſting and affecting as poſſible. The following is the propoſition ſubmitted:

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In CONVENTION of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS. 1788.

THE Convention, having impartially diſcuſſed and fully conſidered the Conſtitution of the United States of America, reported to Congreſs by the Convention of Delegates from the United States of America, and ſubmitted to us by a reſolution of the General Court of the ſaid commonwealth, paſſed the 25th day of October laſt paſt; and acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodneſs of the Supreme Ruler of the Univerſe, in affording the people of the United States, in the courſe of his Providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or ſurprize, of entering into an explicit and ſolemn compact with each other, by aſſenting to and ratifying a new conſtitution, in order to form a more perfect union, eſtabliſh juſtice, inſure domeſtic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and ſecure the bleſſings of liberty to themſelves and their poſterity; do, in the name and in behalf of the Commonwealth of Maſſachuſetts, *aſſent to* and *ratify* the ſaid *Conſtitution of the United States of America.*

And as it is the opinion of this Convention, that certain amendments and alterations in the ſaid Conſtitution would remove the fears and quiet the apprehenſions of many of the good people of this Commonwealth, and more eſpecially guard againſt an undue adminiſtration of the fœderal government; the Convention do therefore recommend that the following alterations and proviſions be introduced into the ſaid Conſtitution:

Firſt, That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expreſly delegated to Congreſs, are reſerved to the ſeveral ſtates, to be by them exerciſed.

Secondly, That there ſhall be one repreſentative to every thirty thouſand perſons, until the whole number of repreſentatives amount to

Thirdly, That Congreſs do not exerciſe the power veſted in them by the 4th ſect. of 1ſt art. but in caſes where a State ſhall neglect or refuſe to make adequate proviſion for an equal repreſentation of the people, agreeably to this Conſtitution.

Fourthly, That Congreſs do not lay direct taxes but when the monies ariſing from the impoſt and exciſe are inſufficient for the public exigencies.

Fifthly, That Congreſs erect no company of merchants, with excluſive advantages of commerce.

Sixthly, That no perſon ſhall be tried for any crime by which he may incur an infamous puniſhment, or loſs of life, until he be firſt indicted by a grand jury, except in ſuch caſes as may ariſe in the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

Seventhly, The Supreme Judicial Fœderal Court ſhall have no juriſdiction of cauſes between citizens of different ſtates, unleſs the matter in diſpute be of the value of dollars at leaſt.

Eighthly, In civil actions, between citizens of different ſtates, every iſſue of fact ariſing in actions at common law may be tried by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, requeſt it.

Ninthly, That the words "without the conſent of Congreſs," in the laſt paragraph in the ninth ſection of the firſt article, be ſtruck out.

AND the Convention do, in the name and in behalf of the people of this Commonwealth, enjoin it upon their repreſentatives in Congreſs, at all times, until the alterations and proviſions aforeſaid have been conſidered, agreeably to the fifth article of the ſaid Conſtitution, to exert all their influence, and uſe all reaſonable and legal methods to obtain a ratification of the ſaid alterations and proviſions, in ſuch manner as is provided in ſaid article.

And that the United States in Congreſs aſſembled may have due notice of the aſſent and ratification of ſaid Conſtitution by this Convention,

It is RESOLVED, That the aſſent and ratification aforeſaid be engroſſed on parchment, together with the recommendation and injunction aforeſaid, and with this reſolution, and that his Excellency JOHN HANCOCK, Eſquire, Preſident, and the Honorable WILLIAM CUSHING, Eſquire, Vice-Preſident of this Convention, tranſmit the ſame, counterſigned by the Secretary of the Convention, under their hands and ſeals, to the United States in Congreſs aſſembled.

On Thurſday laſt, A. M. the hon. Convention finiſhed the diſcuſſion of the Fœderal Conſtitution by paragraphs, on which Mr. Parſons moved, "That this Convention do aſſent to and ratify the Conſtitution of the United States of America, propoſed by the Fœderal Convention." And the conſideration of the motion immediately commenced. In the afternoon his excellency the Preſident communicated the above propoſitions, which were under conſideration Friday and Saturday.

Friday laſt, on motion, the hon. Convention voted, that the final deciſion on the queſtion to accept or reject the Conſtitution in debate be not taken until Tueſday next.

Yeſterday a committee of the hon. Convention, conſiſting of two members from each county, ſat at the Repreſentatives chamber, to conſider of and amend the above propoſitions, and make report.

It is with pleaſure we inſert the following paragraph of a letter received yeſterday by Mr. BRECK, from the Right Honorable the MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE.

"I have written to requeſt you to pay a ſum of money on my account to the unhappy ſufferers by the late fire at Boſton, but am fearful I committed a miſtake, by uſing the word TWO inſtead of THREE Hundred Guineas; if ſo, you will oblige me by correcting that error, and paying the additional ſum."

NEW-YORK, February 8.

To the honor of the minority in the State Convention of Connecticut, it ought to be publicly known, that they, (unlike the obſtinate and unprincipled minority of Pennſylvania) declare, generally, they are determined to abide by the juſt republican principle of ſubmitting to the majority---that they were treated with the utmoſt candor and politeneſs through the whole diſcuſſion---that they conſider the Conſtitution as their Conſtitution---and that among their conſtituents they ſhould inculcate the ſame ſentiments.

On the 31ſt ult. the houſe of Aſſembly agreed that a convention ſhould be called, which was carried by a majority of two, and on the 1ſt of February the Senate concurred by a majority of three. The election to take place on the third Tueſday of April, the ſame number to be elected as for the houſe of aſſembly, and by the ſame rules of procedure; and that the ſaid delegates, ſo to be choſen, do meet in convention, at Poughkeepſie, on the 17th day of June next.

The ſtate of South Carolina has reſolved, that the proceedings of the fœderal convention "be ſubmitted to a convention of the people of the ſtate, for their full and free inveſtigation and deciſion." Their election of delegates is to be on the 11th and 12th of April, and the convention are to meet on the 12th of May in Charleſton.

CHARLESTON, *(South-Carolina) Jan.* 22.
HOUSE OF SENATE.
Extract from the Minutes, January 14, 1788.

Reſolved unanimouſly,

THAT the thanks of this houſe be given to the delegates of this ſtate in the convention holden laſt year at the city of Philadelphia, for their great attention to, and faithful diſcharge of the duties of their appointment.

Ordered, That Mr. Preſident do acquaint the delegates therewith.

Mr. Preſident reported to the houſe, that he had, in obedience to their commands, tranſmitted by letter the unanimous thanks of the houſe to the delegates of this ſtate, for their great attention to, and faithful diſcharge of the duties of their appointment in the fœderal convention, held laſt year at Philadelphia, and that he had received from thoſe delegates letters in anſwer thereto.

Ordered, That the letter addreſſed by Mr. Preſident, tranſmitting the thanks of this houſe to the delegates of this ſtate, in the late convention, held at Philadelphia, together with their anſwers, be read, and entered on the journals.

PHILADELPHIA, *February* 13.

Tueſday next is the Day appointed for the Meeting of the GENERAL ASSEMBLY of this State.

A correſpondent, under the ſignature of A Citizen of the United States, *ſays*---"*It is curious to obſerve the difference and the contrariety of the objections made againſt the new conſtitution. His Excellency Governor Randolph urges the equality of ſuffrage in the ſenate as his principal objection---Mr. Martin of Maryland inveighs with great bitterneſs againſt the inequality of ſuffrage in the houſe of repreſentatives---Mr. Maſon appears much mortified that his conſtitutional council was not incorporated in the plan---Mr. Gerry complains that the rights of election are not properly ſecured, nor an adequate proviſion for the repreſentation of the people---Mr. Lanſing and Mr. Yates remonſtrate againſt any ſyſtem that has the moſt feeble trait of a conſolidated Government---Mr. R. H. Lee and other gentlemen of the ſouthern ſtates object that commercial regulations will be under the undue controul of the eaſtern ſtates----the inhabitants of the latter complain of the unequal burthen of an impoſt, of which the ſouthern ſtates muſt pay but very little from the nature of their population---In the middle ſtates the clamor of oppoſition has been from the want of a bill of rights----Beſides theſe, the commercial ſtates object to parting with their commercial revenues; while the non-importing ſtates complain of being tributary to the others.----Notwithſtanding theſe various objections, all who urge them acknowledge the merit of the new ſyſtem in other points, and frequently in thoſe parts oppoſed by others. Does not all this tend to produce the moſt decided conviction of the difficulties that were encountered by the late fœderal convention, and the ſpirit of conciliation manifeſted in the plan they have propoſed? Does it not equally demonſtrate the utter impoſſibility of another general convention, choſen by a people ſo agitated, and ſo divided, agreeing upon any general ſyſtem? And is it not doubtful, that, after ſuch experience, characters of eminence and ability could be found to undertake the taſk? As ſuch then muſt be the concluſion of every thinking man, he muſt deprecate the wretch with execrations of tenfold horror, who ſhould dare to ſuggeſt means of violence to reconcile ſuch jarring opinions, and to endeavor to involve this peaceful country in the horrors of inteſtine war.*"

The adoption of the new Conſtitution for the United States by an *unanimous* Reſolution of the Convention of Georgia is particularly ſatisfactory to the friends of the propoſed government in this ſtate, as the conſtitution of that commonwealth, like ours, veſts all legiſlative power in a ſingle houſe. It may now be fairly inferred, that the Minority of the Pennſylvania convention are the only body of men in the United States who would object to the new government, becauſe it divides the powers of legiſlation between a firſt and ſecond houſe.

It is remarked with pleaſure, that the unanimous vote of thanks to their deputies in convention, reſolved on by the Senate of South-Carolina, is an happy omen of its adoption by that valuable and flouriſhing ſtate.

What ſhall we ſay, obſerves a correſpondent, to the conduct of the Minority in the Aſſembly and Senate of New-York, who, after having four months to reflect upon the propoſed conſtitution, yet deſired to defer the ſubmiſſion of that important matter to the people. It is bold conduct, thus early after a ſtruggle for liberty, for their new rulers to attempt to reſtrain the people from determining upon their own affairs.

While twelve legiſlatures have ſubmitted the propoſed conſtitution to the people, and the paper-money diſtrict of Little Compton in Rhode-Iſland have inſtructed their repreſentatives to endeavor to procure a convention; while too the conventions of all the five ſtates that have determined the queſtion, have adopted the government, and the approbation of the ſixth is abſolutely certain, it is with infinite ſatisfaction we obſerve that not a ſingle town meeting or public body, but the contemptible and infamous Majority of Rhode-Iſland, have ſhewn a mark of diſapprobation. It is an unanimity moſt honorable to America---a virtue, which will prove its own reward.

Philadelphia, Feb. 9, 1788.

BY virtue of a writ of Venditioni exponas, to me directed, will be expoſed to ſale, by public vendue, at the old Coffee-houſe, in the city of Philadelphia, on Friday, the 22d inſtant, at 6 o'clock in the evening, a certain two ſtory Brick Meſſuage or Tenement, and Lot or Piece of Ground, thereunto belonging, ſituate in the diſtrict of Southwark, and county of Philadelphia, containing in breadth north and ſouth 18 feet, and in length or depth ------- bounded northward with ground late of Peter Widdefield, ſouthward with ground of Joſeph Donaldſon, weſtward with a 50 feet ſtreet (called Swanſon or Water-ſtreet) and eaſtward with the river Delaware, to the utmoſt extent into the ſaid river. Taken in execution as the property of Nathaniel Iriſh, and to be ſold, by

JOSEPH COWPERTHWAIT, Sheriff.

WANTS EMPLOYMENT,

Either in a COUNTING HOUSE or STORE,

A MIDDLE aged perſon, who can be well recommended, and capable of undertaking the above employment, having ſerved near 10 years in one of the firſt wholeſale houſes in London. A line left at the printers, directed for I. R. will be duly attended to.

TO BE SOLD,

A VALUABLE PLANTATION of 150 acres of good land, with large improvements, an old over ſhot griſt mill and oyl mill, 20 acres of watered meadow made, and 20 more may be made, ſituate in Bethel townſhip, Tulpehocken rich ſettlement, in Berks county, about 24 miles weſt from Reading town.

Alſo a new griſt mill and ſaw mill, in Liken's valley, on Wiconeſky creek, with the other improvements. The purchaſer may have 300, 600, or 1000 acres therewith of good land, ſituate in Berks county, about 40 miles from Reading.

Alſo 1200 acres of extraordinary land on Middle creek, a few miles below Sunbury, and near Suſquehanna, where 100 acres of watered meadow may be made, and a griſt mill and ſaw mills may be erected at a ſmall expence.

And 1800 acres on Lycoming creek, of rich good land, where large quantities of watered meadow may be made, and mills erected, a few miles above Samuel Wallis, Eſquire, and a number of ſmaller tracts of good land.

Alſo a valuable plantation of 250 acres, with large improvements, near Muſpillion landing, in Kent county, Delaware ſtate. For terms, enquire of the ſubſcriber, in Vine-ſtreet, Philadelphia. DANIEL WILLIAMS.

Alſo the beſt kind of BOULTING CLOTHS, CHEAP.

THE ſubſcriber, living in Path Valley, Franklin county, ſtate of Pennſylvania, has for ſale the following Tracts of Land, viz.

Three hundred and ſeventy-eight acres in the valley aforeſaid, being the place at preſent occupied by him; ſituate upon the weſt branch of Conegocheague creek, 3 miles from the ſtate road, 100 miles from Baltimore, 160 from Philadelphia; has the following improvements and advantages, viz. a convenient dwelling houſe, large barn, a merchant mill, with two pair of ſtones, one pair of which are French burrs, proven good; bolting works compleat, in a good neighbourhood for wheat, has a good run of country cuſtom and of merchant work, a ſaw mill in good repair, 150 acres cleared and under good fence, about 30 of which is meadow, 50 more of meadow may be made and watered by never failing ſtreams; and an orchard, conſiſting of 180 bearing fruit trees.

Two hundred and ſeventy acres joining the aforeſaid tract, one third whereof may be converted into meadow and watered, has the advantage of a good ſeat upon the creek aforeſaid, for any kind of heavy water works, and a good ſeat for a furnace, upon a conſtant lime-ſtone ſpring.

One hundred and fifty acres, ſituate 5 miles good road from the laſt deſcribed tract, contains a large quantity of iron ore, proved to be of ſuperior quality; the two laſt deſcribed tracts contain every natural conveniency for carrying on the iron buſineſs to advantage.

Five hundred acres in Bedford county, on both ſides of the ſtate road, at the eaſt ſide of Laurel hill, about 8 miles from the Glade ſettlement, known by the name of Jolly Place, 40 acres whereof are cleared, and only wants fencing to be in a ſtate for cultivation, has a good mill ſeat, and a mill is much wanted in the neighbourhood, about one third of this tract is meadow lands of the firſt quality, and is a good ſtand for a houſe of public entertainment. Clear patents and indiſputable titles will be given to the purchaſers, and time given for part of the purchaſe money, by

WILLIAM ELLIOT.

N. B. Mr. John Muſſer, of Lancaſter, can give a particular deſcription of the quality and value of the laſt deſcribed tract.

of the ſtates, who muſt be ſuppoſed to know at what time, and in what place and manner, the elections can beſt be held, ſhould ſo appoint them; it cannot be ſuppoſed that Congreſs, by the power granted by this ſection will alter them: But if the legiſlature of a ſtate ſhould refuſe to make ſuch regulations; the conſequence will be, that the repreſentatives will not be choſen, and the general government will be diſſolved. In ſuch caſe, can gentlemen ſay, that a power to remedy the evil is not neceſſary to be lodged ſomewhere? And where can it be lodged but in Congreſs? I will conſider its advantage in another reſpect; we know, ſir, that a negligence in the appointment of rulers, is the characteriſtick of all nations: in this ſtate, and ſince the eſtabliſhment of our preſent conſtitution, the firſt officers of government have been elected by leſs then one tenth part of the electors in the ſtate. We alſo know that our town-meetings, for the choice of officers, are generally attended by an inconſiderable part of the qualified voters. People attend ſo much to their private intereſt that they are apt to neglect this right. Nations have loſt their liberties by neglecting their priviledges; Conſequently Congreſs ought to have an interpoſing power to awaken the people, when thus negligent. Even ſuppoſing, Sir, the proviſional clauſe ſuggeſted by the worthy gentleman from Norton, ſhould be added; would not Congreſs then be the judges whether the elections in the ſeveral ſtates were conſtitutional and proper? If ſo, it will then ſtand on the ſame ground it now does; It appears evident that there muſt be a general power to regulate general elections. Gentleman have ſaid, the propoſed conſtitution was in ſome places ambiguous; I wiſh they would point out the particular inſtances of ambiguity; for my part I think the whole of it is expreſſed in the plain common language of mankind; If any parts are not ſo explicit as they could be; it cannot be attributed to any deſign, for I believe a great majority of the men who formed it were ſincere and honeſt men.

Mr. Biſhop ſaid the great difficulty with him was, that the power given by the 4th ſection was unlimited; and he did not yet ſee that any advantage would ariſe from its being ſo.

Mr. Cabot (of Berverly) not having ſpoke upon the queſtion of biennial elections of repreſentatives, begged leave to revert to that ſubject, ſo far as to add to what had been ſaid by others, that we ſhould conſider of the particular buſineſs which that body will be frequently called upon to tranſact, eſpecially in the way of revenue; we ſhould conſider that on a queſtion of ſupplies of money to ſupport a war, or purchaſe a treaty, it will be impoſſible for thoſe repreſentatives to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of ſuch ſupplies, until they ſhall have had time to become acquainted with the general ſyſtem of fœderal politics, in its connection or relation to foreign powers; becauſe upon the ſituation of thoſe muſt depend the propriety or impropriety of granting ſupplies: If to this be added a due attention to the eaſieſt way of raiſing ſuch ſupplies, it muſt appear, that biennial elections are as frequent as is conſiſtent with uſing the power of the repreſentatives, for the benefit of their conſtituents.

Mr. C. then turned to the 4th ſection now under debate, and ſaid; it gives me no pain to ſee the anxiety of different gentlemen concerning the paragraph under conſideration, as it evidences a conviction in their minds of what I believe to be true, that a free and equal repreſentation is the beſt, if not the only, foundation upon which a free government can be built, and conſequently that the greateſt care ſhould be taken in laying it. I am, Sir, one of the people; ſuch I ſhall continue, and with their feelings I hold "that the right of electing perſons to repreſent the people in the fœderal government is an important and ſacred right." The opinions that have been offered upon the manner in which the exerciſe of this right is provide for by the 4th ſection, ſatisfies me that we are all ſolicituous for the ſame end, and we only differ as to the means of attaining it, and for my own part, I confeſs that I prize the 4th ſection as highly as any in the conſtitution: Becauſe I conſider the democratic branch of the national government, the branch choſen immediately by the people, as intended to be a check on the fœderal branch, which latter is not an immediate repreſentation of the people of America, and is not choſen by them, but is a repreſentation of the ſovereignty of the individual ſtates, and its members, delegated by the ſeveral ſtate legiſlatures, and if the ſtate legiſlatures are ſuffered to regulate concluſively the elections of the democratic branch, they may by ſuch an interference firſt weaken, and at laſt deſtroy that check; they may at firſt diminiſh, and finally annihilate that controul of the general government, which the people ought always to have through their immediate repreſentatives, as one of the people, therefore, I repeat that in my mind the 4th ſection is to be as highly prized as any in the conſtitution.

Mr. Parſons contended for the veſting in Congreſs the powers contained in the 4th ſection, not only as thoſe powers were neceſſary for preſerving the union, but alſo for ſecuring to the people their equal rights of election. He conſidered the ſubject very fully, but we are able to give our readers very imperfectly the heads of his ſpeech. In the Congreſs, not only the ſovereignty of the ſtates are repreſented in the ſenate, but to balance their power, and to give the people a ſuitable and efficient check upon them, the fœderal repreſentatives are introduced into Congreſs. The legiſlature of the ſeveral ſtates are the conſtitutents of the ſenate, and the people are the conſtituents of the repreſentatives. Theſe two branches, therefore, have different conſtituents, and as they are deſigned as mutual checks upon each other, and to balance the legiſlative powers, there will be frequent ſtruggles and contentions between them—The ſenate will wiſh to controul, depreſs and render inefficient, the repreſentatives: The ſame diſpoſition in the repreſentatives towards the ſenate, will produce the like exertions on their part. The ſenate will call upon their conſtituents, the legiſlatures, for aid. The repreſentatives will look up to the people for ſupport. If, therefore, the power of making and altering the regulations defined in this ſection, are veſted abſolutely in the legiſlature, the repreſentatives will very ſoon be reduced to an undue dependance upon the ſenate, becauſe the power of influencing and controuling the elections of the repreſentatives of the people will be exerted without controul by the conſtituents of the ſenators. He further obſerved, that there was much leſs danger in truſting theſe powers in Congreſs, than in the ſtate legiſlatures. For if the fœderal repreſentatives wiſhed to introduce ſuch regulations as would ſecure to them their places, and a continuance in office, the fœderal ſenate would never conſent, becauſe it would increaſe the influence and check of the repreſentatives; and on the other hand, if the ſenate were aiming at regulations to increaſe their own influence by depreſſing the repreſentatives, the conſent of the latter never would be obtained, and no other regulations would ever obtain the conſent of both branches of the legiſlature, but ſuch as did not affect their mutual rights, and the balance of government, and thoſe regulations would be for the benefit of the people. But a ſtate legiſlature, under the influence of their ſenators, who would have their fulleſt confidence, or under the influence of ambitious or popular characters, or in times of popular commotion, and when faction and party ſpirit run high, would introduce ſuch regulations as would render the rights of the people inſecure and of little value. They might make an unequal and partial diviſion of the ſtate into diſtricts for the election of repreſentatives, or they might even diſqualify one third of the electors. Without theſe powers in Congreſs, the people can have no remedy: But the 4th ſection provides a remedy—A controuling power in a legiſlature, compoſed of ſenators and repreſentatives of twelve ſtates, without the influence of our commotions and factions, who will hear impartially, and preſerve and reſtore to the people their equal and ſacred rights of election. Perhaps it then will be objected, that from the ſuppoſed oppoſition of intereſts in the fœderal legiſlature, they may never agree upon any regulations; but regulations neceſſary for the intereſts of the people can never be oppoſed to the intereſts of either of the branches of the fœderal legiſlature, becauſe the intereſt, of the people require that the mutual powers of that legiſlature ſhould be preſerved unimpaired, in order to balance the government. Indeed, if the Congreſs could never agree on any regulations, then certainly no objection to the 4th ſection can remain, for the regulations introduced by the ſtate legiſlatures will be the governing rule of elections, until Congreſs can agree upon alterations.

Mr. Wedgery inſiſted that we had a right to be jealous of our rulers, who ought never to have a power which they could abuſe. The 4th ſection ought to have gone further, it ought to have had the proviſion in it mentioned by Mr. Biſhop, there would then be a mutual check, and he ſtill wiſhed it to be further explained.

The hon. Mr. White ſaid we ought to be jealous of rulers. All the godly men we read of have failed, nay, he would not truſt a "flock of Moſeſes," if we give up the ſection ſays he, that none ſhould be electors but thoſe worth 50 or an 100l. ſterling, cannot they do it. Yes, ſays he, they can and if any lawyer (alluding to Mr. Parſons) can beat me out of it, I will give him 10 guineas.

Col. Jones (of Boſton) thought, by this power to regulate elections, Congreſs might keep themſelves in to all duration.

The Rev. Mr. Perley wiſhed Mr. Gerry might be aſked ſome queſtions on this ſection. (But Mr. Gerry was not in the houſe.)

Mr. Jones (of Briſtol) ſaid it was not right to argue the poſſibility of the abuſe of any meaſure, againſt its adoption. The power granted to Congreſs by the 4th ſection, ſays he, is a neceſſary power, it will provide againſt negligence and dangerous deſigns. The ſenators and repreſentatives of this ſtate, Mr. Preſident, are now choſen by a ſmall number of electors, and it is likely we ſhall grow equally as negligent of our fœderal elections; or, Sir, a ſtate may refuſe to ſend to Congreſs its repreſentatives, as Rhode Iſland has done. Thus we ſee its neceſſity. To ſay that the power may be abuſed——is ſaying what will apply to all power, The fœderal repreſentatives will repreſent the people—they will be the people—and it is not probable they will abuſe themſelves. Mr J. concluded with repeating, that the arguments againſt this power could be urged againſt any power whatever.

Dr. Jarvis. Many gentlemen have inferred from the rights of regulating elections, by the 4th ſection being inveſted in the fœderal head, that the powers of wreſting this eſſential priviledge from the people would be equally delegated: But it appeared to him, he ſaid, that there is a very material diſtinction in the two caſes——for however poſſible it may be that this controuling authority may be abuſed, it by no means followed, that Congreſs in any ſituation could ſtrip the people of their right to a direct repreſentation——if he could believe in this he ſhould readily join in ſentiment with gentlemen on the other ſide of the houſe, that this ſection alone ſhould be a ſufficient objection to the conſtitution itſelf. The right of election, founded on the principle of equality, was, he ſaid, the baſis on which the whole ſuperſtructure was erected; this right was inherent in the people. It was unalienable in its nature, and it could not be deſtroyed without preſuming a power to ſubvert the conſtitution of which this was the principle, and by recuring to the 2d ſection, it would appear that "repreſentatives and direct taxation ſhall be apportioned among the ſeveral ſtates according to their reſpective numbers:" it equally appeared that 30,000 inhabitants were entitled to ſend a repreſentative, and that wherever this number was found they would have a right to be repreſented in the fœderal legiſlature: If it was argued that Congreſs might abuſe their power, and by varying the places of election, diſtreſs the people, it could only be obſerved, that ſuch a wanton abuſe could not be ſuppoſed: But if it could go to the annihilation of the right he contended the people would not ſubmit——He conſidered the conſtitution as an elective democracy, in which the ſovereignty ſtill reſted in the people, and he by no means could believe that this article was ſo alarming in its nature, or dangerous in its tendency, as many gentlemen had ſuppoſed.

Mr. Holmes, in reply to Dr. Jarvis, ſaid, the worthy gentlemen's ſuperſtructure muſt fall to the ground, for the conſtitution does not provide that every 30,000 ſhall ſend a repreſentative, but that it ſhall not exceed one for every 30,000.

(To be continued.)

Whereas the PARTNERSHIP of

David and Matthew Duncan

Was DISSOLVED on the 1ſt day of October laſt, ALL Perſons INDEBTED to, or who have DEMANDS on the SAME, are requeſted to ſettle with — DAVID DUNCAN.

Philadelphia, Feb. 2, 1788. ct3m.

Pennſylvania Hoſpital Medical Library.

THE following BOOKS are miſſing. The Gentlemen who have them in poſſeſſion will oblige the Contributors, by returning them to WILLIAM GARDNER, Apothecary, at the Hoſpital.

Van Swieten's Commentaries, Vol. 7th.
Aſtruc on the Venereal Diſeaſe, Vol. 2d.
M'Quere's Elements of Chemiſtry, Vol. 1ſt.
Hoffman's Works, Vol. 5th.

By order of a Board of Managers,

1ſt Mo. 28, 1788. SAMUEL COATES, Clerk.

TO BE LETT,

A PLANTATION, with a large tract of banked meadow, ſituate in Glouceſter county, New-Jerſey, oppoſite to Cheſter. Any perſon, with a good capital, inclinable to take the above, may know the terms, by applying as the Printers will direct.

TO BE SOLD,

A LARGE two-ſtory Stone Dwelling-Houſe and Kitchen, and Lot or Piece of Ground, Situate on Germantown main ſtreet, above the market-houſe, being about 133 feet and 9 inches front, and 396 feet back: Having thereon a Tan-Yard with 32 Vats, Lime-Handlers, a Stone Bark and Mill-Houſe, Currying and Lime-Houſe, a good Spring with a Spring-Houſe and Pump, a large Copper Boiler, Barn, Waggon-houſe, Stables, Garden, &c. containing about an acre, and is known by the name of JONES's TAN-YARD.

Alſo a Tract or Piece of Land, ſituate back of the above premiſes, fronting on Benſel's lane, leading to Schuylkill, very well improved, and having a conſiderable number of excellent Fruit-Trees.

Any perſon inclining to purchaſe the above premiſes, together or ſeparately, is deſired to apply to PETER LE BARBIER DUPLESSIS, Eſquire, in Cheſnut-ſtreet, near Third-ſtreet, or to JOSEPH FERREE.

N. B. An indiſputable title will be given for the above, as the mortgage will be previouſly diſcharged, and PENNSYLVANIA or JERSEY MONEY taken for half of the purchaſe money.

The above, if not ſold within a month from the date hereof, will be let. Enquire as above, where a number of Tracts of Land, patented or only warranted, may be had, at the moſt reaſonable price. Philadelphia, February 1, 1788.

Goſhen, Cheſter county, January 21, 1788.

BY virtue of a writ of Levari Facias, to me directed, will be expoſed to public ſale, on Thurſday, the 14th day of February next, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, on the premiſes, A meſſuage, plantation and tract of land, ſituate in the township of Weſt-town, containing 91 acres more or leſs, bounded by lands of Aaron James, Joſhua Hoops and others; ſeized and taken in execution, as the eſtate of Iſaiah Hoops and John Brown, and to be ſold, by EZEKIEL LEONARD, Sheriff.

Goſhen, Cheſter county, January 21, 1788.

BY virtue of a writ of Levari Facias, to me directed, will be expoſed to public Sale, on Friday, the 15th day of February next, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, on the premiſes, A Meſſuage, Plantation and Tract of Land, ſituate in the Townſhip of Williſtown, containing 253 acres more or leſs; bounded by lands of Stephen Davie, Samuel Evans and others; ſeized and taken in execution as the eſtate late of John Boggs, deceaſed, and to be ſold, by † EZEKIEL LEONARD, Sheriff.

New-Caſtle, January 8, 1788.

For Sale by Public Auction,

THE real eſtate late of JOHN VAN GEZELL, deceaſed; ſituate in the town of New-Caſtle, in the Delaware ſtate, conſiſting of a Brick Meſſuage and Lot of Ground, where the ſaid deceaſed had lived, on the north-weſt ſide of Front or Water-ſtreet. A large unimproved Lot, adjacent to the aforeſaid meſſuage, on the ſouth-weſterly ſide thereof, extending from Front-ſtreet to the market ſquare. Two other Brick Meſſuages occupied together, and their Lots, extending into the river Delaware, now in the tenure of Gunning Bedford, Eſquire, the beſt ſituation in the town for erecting a wharff upon. One other Brick Meſſuage and Lot, on the ſouth-ſide of the ſtreet leading from the Court-houſe to the river, in the tenure of Mr. Yeates. One Frame Meſſuage and its Lot, in the tenure of Capt. Webb, adjoining the next preceding lot; and a graſs Lot, containing between 4 and 5 acres, lying on the back ſtreet of the ſaid town and the road leading thereout towards Chriſtiana bridge, in the tenure of Mr. Lyon. The ſale aforeſaid to be made by the ſubſcriber, as executor of the deceaſed, in purſuance of his laſt will, on Tueſday, the 19th of February next, in the town of New-Caſtle, for the payment of the deceaſed's debts; on which day his creditors or their agents are requeſted to attend, (as the executor is apprehenſive that the whole of the property of the ſaid deceaſed may not, in the preſent ſcarcity of caſh, ſell for ſufficient to pay the debts, unleſs a credit ſhall be given to the purchaſers for the greater part of the purchaſe monies, and this the principal creditors of the deceaſed ſhould aſſent unto.) All ſuch creditors as have not tranſmitted a ſtate of their demands to the executor, are requeſted ſo to do before the ſaid day of ſale, to enable him to adjuſt the ſame for due order of payment.

GEORGE READ.

Juſt Publiſhed, and to be Sold by
THOMAS DOBSON and WILLIAM YOUNG, in Second-ſtreet, and JOSEPH CRUKSHANK, in Market-ſtreet.

CONDUCTOR GENERALIS:

OR THE

OFFICE, DUTY *and* AUTHORITY

OF

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE,

High-Sheriffs, Under-Sheriffs, Coroners, Conſtables, Goalers, Jury-Men, and Overſeers of the Poor.

AS ALSO

The OFFICE *of* CLERKS *of* ASSIZE *and of the* PEACE, &c.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

Several choice MAXIMS in LAW, &c.

Compiled chiefly from *Burn's Juſtice*, and the ſeveral other books on thoſe ſubjects.

By JAMES PARKER, Eſquire, *late* Juſtice *of the* Peace *in Middleſex county, New-Jerſey.*

Adapted to theſe United States.

The whole Alphabetically digeſted under the ſeveral titles; with a Table, directing to the ready finding out the proper matter under thoſe titles---*Neatly bound*; *Price* 11/3.

*** This Book is highly eſteemed, and very neceſſary for gentlemen in the commiſſion of the peace; likewiſe for every other perſon, who would wiſh to be acquainted with the laws of the land we live in.

At the above Stores alſo may be had, juſt Publiſhed,

Newton's Deſſertations on the Prophecies, 2 vols. 20/.
Edwards's Hiſtory of Redemption, 10/.
Edwards on Religious Affections, 10/.

Eveſham townſhip, Burlington county, Jan. 28, 1788.

THREE POUNDS Reward.

RAN away, this morning, from the ſubſcriber, an apprentice lad, named JOHN WHITECRAFT, about 19 years of age, of a ſandy complexion, freckled in the face; had on and took with him, a fuſtian coatee, jacket and overalls, a new round hat, a pair of woollen trowſers, two jackets, one nap, the other coarſe cloth of a light colour, two pair of ſtockings, one white, the other blue. Whoever takes up and ſecures ſaid apprentice, ſo that his maſter may get him again, ſhall have the above reward, paid by ‡ WILLIAM SHARP.

PHILADELPHIA: Printed by HALL and SELLERS, at the NEW-PRINTING OFFICE, near the MARKET.